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The death of John Dickinson on April 9th of this year has brought
to a close the career of one of the most brilliant and distinguished men
of our time. Seldom has anyone combined such unique versatility and
competence in so many fields of learning and endeavor. A scholar
of world repute and a leader among men and in affairs, he died in
the prime of life, the fullness of his course not run. For nearly
twenty years he taught at the Law School as Professor of Law,
despite a busy career as a public servant, a practicing lawyer and a
corporation executive; and he added immeasurably to its reputation
by the quality of his teaching, the brilliance of his writings and the
scope of his educational ideas. He was a man of rare culture and pro-
found learning, not only in the law but in history, in politics, in
economics, and in legal philosophy. Of each of these fields he was an
accomplished master, yet he dealt with them not as separate disciplines
nor as ends in themselves but as related channels or manifestations of
fundamental principles in the evolution and functioning of society. He
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read extensively in foreign languages, and as readily as in English, and
what he read he remembered, adding constantly to an encyclopedic
stock of knowledge which he interpreted by his penetrating understand-
ing of human affairs. He brought to all his work extraordinary com-
mon sense and a seemingly effortless understanding and grasp of the
most complex problems. To the classroom he brought both the mature
reflection of the scholar and the practical wisdom of the man of affairs;
to his legal practice he brought a prodigious knowledge of history,
economics and philosophy, together with the objectivity of the scholar
and the great teacher's capacity for explanation and analogy. This
unique balancing of learning and common sense approached, and often
amounted to, genius. He possessed also an amazing capacity to deduce
general principles from a series of concrete instances and to see the
scope as well as the limitation of their application. His point of view
both in scholarship and in everyday matters reflected not only his
familiarity with men and events of the past but also his understanding
of the deeper principles which underlie issues and motivate men in what
they think and do. Thus, he viewed the present against the clear per-
spective of the past and in the light of observed uniformities of human
behavior. It was this broad point of view, coupled with his extraor-
dinary legal acumen and understanding of economics and business, that
made him a brilliant lawyer and leader at the Bar who has left a per-
manent mark on our constitutional law.
It was said of Justinian that he was born old. If this remark
is to be understood as meaning that he had remarkable maturity of
judgment and powers of thought and reasoning, of concentration and
reflection, which generally do not come before middle age, the same
may be said of John Dickinson. Dickinson seems to have possessed
these characteristics early in life. He was not one of those to whom
maturity comes late and who grow wise slowly. At the same time,
it must not be thought that the mould of his opinions was set, or that
his interests were inflexible, or that he was impervious to new ideas,
or reluctant to recognize change. On the contrary, he quickly sensed
new trends and the significance of new events, and he was always alert
to increase his store of knowledge, to find out how people thought
about particular questions, to compare conclusions, and to work out
new solutions for old problems. Although his convictions upon many
matters were unshakable, he had a remarkable capacity to learn from
those with whom he differed. His amazing memory not only for
facts, but for the views and conclusions of others, and for the reason-
ing processes which lay behind them, meant that his horizons were
forever moving and expanding. His experience, like his knowledge,
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was cumulative, and he could marshal to bear on new problems a vast
battalion of facts, techniques and conceptions derived from related
disciplines. His wide acquaintance with people, their motives and their
reactions, made it possible for him, to grasp instantly the scope of an
issue or of a situation and to forecast its development in a manner
that was almost uncanny. Whether he was concerned with a problem
of economics, or of political science, or with the complex and more
concrete problems of executive action or of legal strategy, his decisions
were sure and his judgments clear. His capacity to move into new
fields or to work among new problems was a reflection not only of
his tremendous energy and vitality but of his shrewd and immediate
apprehension of the scope of the problem at hand. These qualities
were a reflection of a serious attitude and cast of mind, but they were
accompanied and balanced by a keen sense of humor. There was
about him a massiveness of personality, which comported with his
broad-shouldered figure, and which with the quick blue eyes, the de-
liberate gestures, the resonant but modulated voice, made him the
dominant figure in any group.
John Dickinson, christened John Sharpe Dickinson, was born at
Greensboro, on the Eastern Shore of Maryland, on February 24, 1894.
The only child of Willard and Caroline Schnauffer Dickinson, he was
descended on liis father's side from distinguished New England and
Maryland families of which the most celebrated was his famous name-
sake who wrote the Farmer's Letters and drafted the Articles of Con-
federation. Dickinson grew up in a tradition of which history and
intellectual pursuits formed an important part and in an environment
conducive to reading and study. Until the age of nine, he was taught
at home, principally by his mother, who recognized the early signs of
promise and developed in him habits of self-discipline and work. His
childhood was spent on the Eastern Shore until 1903, when the family
moved to Baltimore in order to put him in school. He was entered
in public school but withdrawn after a week, when his teachers com-
plained that he was backward, and placed in the seventh grade of the
Boys' Latin School, where he completed his elementary and secondary
education. There he had the good fortune to be a favorite pupil of the
distinguished scholar and novelist, Edward Lucas White, and acquired
from him a lasting taste for Greek and Latin literature. He dis-
tinguished himself with a record that has had no equal in the one hun-
dred and eight years of the School's history. After graduation he at-
tained an even more remarkable scholastic record at Johns Hopkins,
from which he was graduated at the age of 19 with highest honors in
the Classics, with an average for the four years that was .08% less
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than perfect. In his senior year, he was president of the student body,
chairman of the debating council, editor-in-chief of the college weekly,
and author of the class poem.
From Hopkins Dickinson went to the newly established graduate
college at Princeton, where he devoted himself to the study of history,
political science and jurisprudence. In 1915 he received his A.M.
degree for work in the legal and ethical aspects of industrial and social
legislation, and he was awarded the Macdonald Fellowship for 1915-
16, and a Procter Fellowship for 1916-17. War interrupted his
studies for two years, during which time he served successively as an
economist on the War Trade Board and as a First Lieutenant at-
tached to the Army General Staff in Washington. In 1918-19 he
taught American and mediaeval history at Amherst College, but re-
turned to Princeton in time to complete his dissertation on "The Mean-
ing of Democracy" and receive the Ph.D. degree in June, 1919. By
that time he had decided that he wanted the formal training of the
law, and accordingly enrolled at the Harvard Law School in the
autumn of 1919. Throughout his law school course he acted as Tutor
in the Division of History, Government and Economics at Harvard
College, and also studied settlement work as a volunteer member of
the staff of the South End House, in Boston. The summers he spent
in Northampton as law clerk in the office of John C. Hammond, where
in an earlier day Calvin Coolidge had begun his legal practice. Al-
though invited to join the Board of the Harvard Law Review, Dick-
inson declined because of the pressures of outside interests, which in-
cluded the completion of a book, The Building of an Army, in which
were reviewed the legislative and administrative procedures whereby
manpower and materiel were assembled for the American armed forces
in World War I. He completed the three-year course at Harvard
in two years and received the LL.B. degree in June, 1921, and upon
graduation he began the practice of law with the firm of McAdoo,
Cotton & Franklin in New York. In the following year he moved out
to Los Angeles at the invitation of William G. McAdoo, whose law
partner he became and whose candidacy for the presidential nomina-
tion he actively supported in 1924. During the same period, Dickin-
son undertook an elaborate study in the field of labor relations in the
women's garment industry in New York at the request of a commis-
sion appointed by Governor Smith, and the report was printed in 1925
under the title Report of an Investigation of the Cloak, Suit, and
Skirt Industry, New York City. In 1925 he returned to the East .to
accept an appointment as Lecturer in the Department of Government
at Harvard, and for two years taught classes and participated in tutorial
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conference work both there and at Radcliffe. During this period he
completed and published his masterly and pioneer study of administra-
tive law, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law (1927),
and wrote several articles of recognized importance in the fields of
history' and political science.2  He also translated and edited one of
the great mediaeval treatises on political thought, the Policraticus of
John of Salisbury, which was published in 1927 as The Statesman's
Book of John of Salisbury. Although Dickinson described himself at
this period as "a brash young man" because of his forthrightness in
expressing his views and ideas, his intellectual vigor and scholarship
and the effectiveness of his teaching won him the immediate respect
and admiration of the senior members of the Faculty, including Presi-
dent Lowell. His career at Harvard was assured, but he resigned in
1927 because of an academic intrigue which he found distasteful, and
returned to Princeton on a smaller salary as Assistant Professor of
Politics. Dickinson's work at Princeton Professor Corwin has praised
as a "wonderful success," both in his preceptorial in the course on Con-
stitutional Interpretation and in his lectures in a course on Political
Theory which he developed on his own. In addition, he lectured each
week on International Relations at Bryn Mawr College and also at
the Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Political Science
in Washington.
Dickinson's Administrative Justice, published by the Harvard
University Press in 1927, was now out, and it attracted the immediate
attention of the legal profession," as did a series of articles in the fields
of jurisprudence and legal theory which began to appear in the Ameri-
can Political Science Review 4 and in the Columbia Law Review.'
Henry Wolf Bikl6, then General Attorney of the Pennsylvania Rail-
road, and Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Penn-
sylvania Law School, brought his name to the attention of the Law
School Faculty, with the result that he received an immediate offer
as Professor of Law. An offer had also come from Yale College, and
Princeton had countered both with the tempting bait of a full profes-
sorship in the Department of Politics. Although it was with great
1. The Mediaeval Conception of Kingship, 1 Spncmnum 308 (1926); The
Massachusetts Charter and the Bay Colony (1628-1660), in 1 ComSoNwEALTH
HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETS 93 (Hart ed. 1927); Economic Regulations and Re-
strictions on Personal Liberty in Early Massachusetts in PocuTucHr VAI.L=
MEmo0Ls AssN. PRoc. 485 (1927).
2. A Working Theory of Sovereignty, 42 Po. Sci. Q. 524 (1927), 43 id. 32
(1928).
3. See also Judicial Control of Official Discretion, 22 Am. Pot.. Sci. REv. 275
(1928) ; Administrative Law and Fear of Bureaucracy, 14 A.B.AJ. 513, 597 (1928).
4. Social Order and Political Authority, 23 Am. PoT. Sci. Rnv. 293, 593 (1929).
5. The Law Behind Law, 29 Cot. L. RFv. 113, 285 (1929).
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reluctance that he left his Princeton associates and former teachers,
Dickinson accepted Pennsylvania's offer, and held the position of
Professor of Law from 1929 until his resignation in 1948.
At the Law School, John Dickinson made for himself a lasting
mark. Not only was he a highly successful teacher, but he was a
stimulating colleague whose immense learning and capacity for work
were a constant source of inspiration. Through his writings he gained
immediate recognition as an expert, and this was particularly so in
the field of jurisprudence, where he won for himself an international
reputation. Upon arrival in Philadelphia, he commenced the publica-
tion of a series of important articles upon fundamental questions of
legal philosophy which attracted attention not only by the originality
of their ideas but by the vigor with which they were expressed.' At
that time, much of the legal thinking which was being done in this
country centered on the efforts of the so-called new school of skeptical
or realistic jurists to dissolve the law into a fluid mass of factors of
any and every kind which happen to influence the decision of any par-
ticular judge in a specific case. This position, that law is simply what-
ever judges do, that the law of every case is different from the law of
every other case, and that a body of law exists only insofar as there can
be said to be a behavioristic psychology of judges, Dickinson strongly
attacked. To him it seemed plain that any pragmatic view of the
judicial process must recognize that there are factors which for want
of some other name can be called legal rules and which under a de-
veloped legal system do in fact exert an influence on the process. At
the same time, he was entirely unsympathetic with the view that legal
rules alone are controlling and that they are so related into a rational
system that the rule for any case can be deduced by the process of
logic alone from that system. He was, in other words, as opposed to
the old absolutism under which the rule was everything as he was to
the new absolutism under which it was nothing. These ideas he de-
veloped in an article, first published in the pages of our Review,7 in
which he explored the problem of the "unprovided case"-the case
which does not fall squarely and obviously within the terms of a statute
or rule established by precedent. Two other articles 8 carried the
analysis further-the interaction between legal rules on the one hand
and discretion on the other which is presented by the decision of cases
6. Dickinson's ideas attracted particularly the attention of Mr. Justice Cardozo,
who frequently referred to them in his printed works. E.g., SELscrEI W=riNGs
oF CaRlozo 13, 15, 288 (Hall ed. 1947).
7. The Problem of the Unprovided Case, 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 115 (1932).
8. Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. OF PA. L. REv.
833 (1931) ; Legal Rules: Their Application and Elaboration, 79 U. OF PA. L. Rr.
1052 (1931).
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requiring what the continental jurists call "elaboration" of law.' Al-
though Dickinson's thinking was considerably influenced by the school
of sociological jurisprudence which advocates that the law for new
cases should be sought in large measure by resort to considerations of
social ends and purposes and of current views about moral and economic
values, he believed that the process of collecting and selecting ideas
drawn from the outside can be properly utilized only through the in-
strumentality of logical reasoning. His general position appears to
have grown out of his basic attitude towards law, which he viewed
as built up and pieced together as one of the incidents of the growth
of human civilization, and arising both from the tendency of people to
act in accordance with custom or habit and from the willingness of in-
dividuals to follow the mandates of some organ of authority, provided
always that that authority, in its dealings with individuals, acts ac-
cording to rules and towards one individual as towards another. He
recognized that no two cases are ever alike, and that only relative cer-
tainty can be achieved; but he believed that like other human values
it need not be regarded as valueless because imperfectly achieved. The
predilection of newer theories of jurisprudence for government through
discretionary administrative agencies of experts he condemned as in-
consistent with fundamental human interests and desires and as being
essentially the view that government should be by philosopher-kings
-a view which lost out long ago in the competition of the market
place. "Government by law," he wrote, "although at the expense of
a certain amount of flexibility, can at least institutionalize the common
sense wisdom of mankind, while the wisdom of the philosopher-king
can often be proved to be wisdom only by the persuasive force of bul-
lets and bombs." 10 Dickinson's views about the nature of law are
also revealed in his distrust of theories of natural law, which result
in making law ultimately personal and subjective. He viewed with
concern the modern recurrence of natural law theory, with its doctrine
of absolute rights, which "promises ill for the patient and conciliatory
solution of some of the deepest problems of modern civilization." 11
Dickinson's principal and regular courses at the Law School were
those in Constitutional and Administrative Law, but he also taught,
at one time or another, Taxation, Quasi-Contracts, Persons, Public
Utilities, and a course in Methods of Legal Thinking and Analysis.
In class, he tended to employ the lecture technique somewhat more
9. Cf. DABIN, LA PHILosOPHIE DE L'ODw, JURMIQUE POSITIF c. 1, § 1 (1929).
10. My Philosophy of Law, in My PHLOSOPHY OF LAW: CF.os OF SIXTEEN
AmumcAx SCHOLARS (1941).
11. The Problem of the Unprosided Case, 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 115, 128 (1932).
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than he did the Socratic technique traditionally used in conjunction
with the case method. His point of view towards the nature of law
made him distrust the assumption of Langdell that the entire body of
existing precedents, if treated inductively, would reveal themselves as
a system of particular instances of the application of certain general
principles from which could then be deduced the proper rule to apply
to any particular case falling within the principle. He believed that
the case method by itself tends to foster in the minds of many students
the presupposition that somewhere behind the apparent inconsistency
of decisions there must be a mysterious higher rule upon which the
judges relied and which, could it but be discovered, would bring the
cases into logical harmony. He thought that the mental attitude thus
promoted tended further to foster the idea that law need conform to
no more concrete or exacting test than abstract and verbal logic, and
that for the student without much background of thought or informa-
tion it became difficult to resist the meretricious allurements of di-
chotomy and syllogism. In Dickinson's view, the satisfactory applica-
tion of the case method involved much more, therefore, than the de-
velopment of legal categories of analysis; it involved also the introduc-
tion of outside information and the evolution therefrom of other cate-
gories of analysis and criticism for the purpose of subjecting each case
to external criteria not apparent on the face of the report. Accordingly,
a student recitation, which was accompanied by prodding questions
forcing the student to pinpoint the principal legal issues of the case at
hand, was followed by Dickinson's own discussion, which opened up
wide vistas of the influences which constantly press upon doctrines and
decisions. He lit candles of understanding by which students were
made to see that the law is not a body of fixed rules but grows and
develops in response to a host of extralegal influences, such as the
prevailing state of public opinion, the bias of a particular court, the
exaggerated prestige of counsel. All this was presented by a master
of economics and history who not only had a familiar and detailed
knowledge of the personalities of the judges and their points of view
but had devoted long hours of thought to fundamental problems in
the relation between law and government. Although Dickinson never
left any doubt as to his own attitude about the correctness of a decision
or of the reasoning upon which it was based, he never neglected to
present opposing points of view. In these discourses the full flavor
of his personality came to the fore-the massiveness and the humor,
the alertness and deftness of his thinking. If students found it hard to
interrupt a veritable cascade of learning, these presentations were never
doctrinaire but were always a stimulus to independent thought and
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further work. Most students seem to have thought him at his best
in the portion of the Administrative Law course which dealt with
judicial review and in the portion of the Constitutional Law course
which dealt with the Commerce Clause. His effectiveness in the latter
was no doubt due in considerable measure to his conviction that no
clause of the Constitution is more vitally involved in the transition in
our constitutional system through which we are passing. Of the deep
impressions made on the hundreds of students who sat at his feet,
none is perhaps more characteristic of Dickinson than the patience
with which he would help the faltering student or the tolerance which
he displayed towards a defective recitation. Discourtesy and sarcasm
were never used as teaching tools.
Soon after Dickinson entered upon his professorship, he began to
engage in a number of non-academic activities which were to continue
for the entire period of his teaching. The first of these activities was
legal practice. In 1930 he became associated with the firm of Sullivan
& Cromwell in New York, and among the cases in which he partici-
pated directly was the anti-trust suit brought by the Department of
Justice against the sugar refining industry. 2 In this case Dickinson
prepared an elaborate economic brief which later formed the basis of
an article published in 1932 '3 and in which he took the position
that the anti-trust laws were not so effective as they might be be-
cause of their leniency in permitting mergers and the kind of "dog-
eat-dog" competition which always operates in favor of monopoly.
He argued, therefore, that the Sherman Act should be strengthened
so as to outlaw at the start business practices which tended to be de-
structive of competition, while at the same time cooperative activities
and agreements among businessmen should be permitted when con-
sistent with the continuance of the competitive system.
The second phase of Dickinson's non-academic activities was in
government service. During the years following the termination of
his professional association with William G. McAdoo, Dickinson had
remained in close touch with him and had been among his advisors on
political matters.' In 1932, in the pre-convention campaign of Gov-
ernor Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dickinson became closely associated with
another of McAdoo's close political friends, Daniel C. Roper. Roose-
velt's nomination was brought about in considerable part through the
efforts of McAdoo, and when Roosevelt was elected President, Roper
became Secretary of Commerce, and in 1933 he and McAdoo invited
Dickinson to become Assistant Secretary of Commerce. Dickinson
12. United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
13. The Anti-Trust Laws and the Self-Regidation of Industry, 18 A.B.A.J. 600
(1932).
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accepted, and as a result spent the next several years in Washington.
He continued, however, to conduct his classes at the Law School, and
also found time to do a very considerable amount of writing. 4
Much of Dickinson's time and attention while Assistant Secretary
of Commerce was taken up in connection with the agencies charged
with the regulation of merchant shipping and commercial airways. In
all these matters he exhibited superb administrative gifts. At the
same time, through his speeches and his writings, he sought to explain
what he then believed to be the basic purpose and philosophy of the
New Deal.'5 Although he saw that the scope of the functions of gov-
ernment must be enlarged, he did not realize during his first year in
Washington the form which New Deal planning would take. In
his approach to the problems of economic reconstruction he was no
utopian, but recognized realistically the force of inherited conditions
and the part that political compromise must play in planning the
methods necessary for industrial recovery. Of the various tasks which
fell to his lot, the two which he felt most useful were his participation
in Secretary Hull's reciprocal trade program and his part in the estab-
lishment of the Federal Register for the publication of administrative
regulations and orders. He appeared before committees of Congress
in support of both measures and took an active part on the inter-
departmental committee which formulated policy for the reciprocal trade
program. Certain other activities did not meet with like success. Thus
he failed in his effort to have General Hugh Johnson as N.R.A.
Administrator brought under the control of a Cabinet Committee,
and his efforts as chairman of a committee appointed by Roosevelt to
formulate stock exchange regulations came to naught. The committee
drafted a report, largely the work of Dickinson, which he defended
in a lengthy argument before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce. Nevertheless, the report was discarded, and it
was Dickinson's opinion that his proposals were not sufficiently radical
to satisfy some of the influences which were then becoming prominent
in the White House. However, by his public arguments before the
Congressional committees, he was responsible for the elimination of
14. See especially The Gold Decisions, 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 715 (1935);
"Defect of Power" in Constitutional Law, 9 TEMP. L.Q. 388 (1935) ; Crime and the
Constitution, 21 A.B.A.J. 739 (1935) ; The States Under the Constitution, 16 AcAD.
PoL. Sci. PRoc. 421; Administrative Law Under the Constitution, 7 Mo. B.J. 107
(1936). Further references may be found in note 15 infra.
15. See especially, The Major Issues Presented by the National Recovery Act,
33 CoL. L. Ray. 1095 (1933); Political Aspects of the New Deal, 28 Am. PoL
Sc. REv. 197 (1934); The Economics of the Recovery Program, in CURRENT
EcONOMIc PROBLEMS (Hubbard ed. 1934); Understanding and Misunderstanding
the Recovery Program, 172 ANNALS 1 (1934).
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several features of the substitute legislation prepared by Landis, Cohen
and Corcoran, such as the immediate and complete outlawing of all
margin trading and short selling, and the subjection of state and
municipal bond issues to federal control.
In the late spring of 1935 Dickinson resigned as Assistant Sec-
retary of Commerce to become Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice. At that time
the government was so actively engaged in promoting various com-
binations and cooperative activities in industry that no "trust-busting"
campaign was contemplated, and the functions of the Anti-Trust Di-
vision were devoted largely to the defense of various government
regulatory measures in the courts. Dickinson spent the next year and
a half in arguing cases chiefly in the United States Supreme Court,
but to some extent also in the lower federal courts. The most cele-
brated of these cases was the defense of the Bituminous Coal Con-
servation Act, otherwise known as the Guffey Coal Act. This case
Dickinson tried personally in the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia and afterwards argued in the United States Supreme Court.16
According to the newspapers, he spoke in the latter tribunal for three
hours and a half without interruption from the Bench, and his argu-
ment, which was acclaimed as the greatest forensic effort in recent
memory, caused the Court for the first time to recognize the constitu-
tional power of Congress to regulate the price of articles sold in inter-
state commerce, although the labor features of the Act, which were
hastily drawn and unworkable, were stricken down. His argument,
which was taken down stenographically and published as a Senate docu-
ment, was often before Government counsel who prepared the argu-
ments involving the constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act and
before counsel preparing the initial arguments involving the validity of
the Wagner Act.'
7
In all, Dickinson argued about a dozen important cases in the
Supreme Court during this period."8 Next in importance to the
16. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 63 Wash. L. Rep. 986 (1935), 298 U.S. 238
(1936).
17. Va. Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937);
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Associated Press
v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103 (1937). I am indebted to Hon. Charles E. Wyzanski,
Jr., for these references.
18. The most important of these cases are as follows: St. Joseph Stock Yards
Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936) ; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936); Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426 (1936); United States v. Corrick,
298 U.S. 435 (1936); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298
U.S. 131 (1936); Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936); American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232 (1936) ; Kentucky Whip &
Collar Co. v. Ill. Central R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937) ; Hill, Warden v. United States
ex rel. Weiner, 300 U.S. 105 (1937); Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States,
300 U.S. 139 (1937) ; Powell v. United States, 300 U.S. 276 (1937).
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Carter Coal Case was the St. Joseph Stock Yards Case, 9 which laid
down a formula substantially as suggested by Dickinson for the scope
of judicial review of rate orders by public regulatory bodies when chal-
lenged as unconstitutional. Another important case was United States
v. Owlett ° which he argued before the District Court of the Middle
District of Pennsylvania at Harrisburg. This case settled the rule in
accord with Dickinson's argument that state authorities are constitu-
tionally debarred from investigating federal agencies or compelling the
production of federal records by subpoena.
In 1936, Dickinson decided to take up private practice and to
continue with his teaching and writing as before. For this decision
there were a number of reasons. He had been a delegate to the Na-
tional Democratic Convention and had not been sympathetic either
with the repeal of the two-thirds rule or with what he regarded as the
demagogic antagonism to business that characterized the dominant
trend within the Administration. He had sought to formulate his
own views on the economics presented by the New Deal not only in
speeches and articles but in a book written in 1935 and published un-
der the title of Hold Fast the Middle Way. This book, which em-
phasizes the important part played by business men, business organiza-
tions and investment in providing the means for a higher standard of
living in every community, met with no favorable reception or indeed
any reception at all within the Administration. This attitude ac-
corded with Dickinson's experience at the Department of Commerce,
when Secretary Roper and he had formed a Business Advisory Coun-
cil to provide the Administration with the results of business thought as
applied to the economic problems with which the Administration was
attempting to deal. The reports prepared by this Council with great
care and trouble were ignored at the White House. Dickinson came
to the conclusion that all the White House seemed to want was a
"front" of business men who would express approval of its political
plans. Another point on which Dickinson privately felt serious dis-
trust of the Administration was in connection with its foreign policy.
In 1935 the Administration lent aid and support to Senator Wheeler
and Senator Borah in passing the so-called "Neutrality Act" of that
year. This seemed to him an ill-advised piece of isolationism com-
parable to the effort of Thomas Jefferson to keep us out of European
entanglements by embargoing American trade, and, in his private ca-
pacity as a member of the American Society of International Law,
19. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, supra note 18.
20. 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
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he expressed his views with considerable force in a paper delivered
before that Society at its 1935 meeting in Washington.21
Distrust of the new tendencies within the Administration was
undoubtedly inevitable, when looked at from the standpoint of Dick-
inson's general point of view towards law and government. Like his
famous namesake, he was neither doctrinaire nor subservient to idea
patterns and contemporary dogmas. He was eager to probe down to
fundamentals which would be valid for yesterday, today and tomor-
row. Democracy, he thought, can operate effectively only through the
patient and conciliatory solution of problems; and he was, therefore,
opposed to the new philosophy of government which he considered to
embody a theory of governmental absolutism which repudiated the
idea of legal controls. Although he regarded government regulation
as both necessary and important, the new concept of planning, in his
mind, could tolerate no limitation on the freedom of government dis-
cretion to make such readjustments in human relations as might be
required to effectuate its plan. Moreover, instead of accelerating the
progress of man towards an ever-rising standard of living, the new
program would slowly and surely dry up the sources from which fur-
ther improvement must come. The central idea of his own philosophy
was individual effort and personal responsibility, a point of view which
he identified with the common law, which neither guarantees nor prom-
ises an improvement in the material conditions of the common man
but seeks merely to clear the way for effort. About these views Dick-
inson was outspoken from the start. They were presented, from time
to time, and with great cogency, before such groups as the American
Philosophical Society 22 and state bar associations.2' His general posi-
tion undoubtedly made him increasingly dissatisfied with the Ad-
ministration for which he worked and contributed largely to his deter-
mination to return to private life.
After the election in 1936, when it could no longer be said that
he was deserting in the face of a campaign, Dickinson made arrange-
ments to return to Philadelphia, where he had been invited by his old
friend Henry Bikl6, then General Counsel of the Pennsylvania Rail-
road, to join his Legal Staff. The period of Dickinson's association
with the Railroad, first as General Solicitor (1937-41), later as Gen-
eral Counsel (1941-46), and finally as Vice President-General Counsel
21. Neutrality and Commerce, 29 Am. Soc'Y INTL L. PRoc. 106 (1935).
22. The Old Political Philosophy and the New, 87 Am. PEwos. Soc'Y PROC.
246 (1943).
23. The Common Man and the Commo; Law, Annual Address Before the Vir-
ginia State Bar Assn. (1943). See also, Planned Society, 37 BuL. Cou. WLLAm
AND MARY 1 (1943).
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(1946-52), proved to be one of the most important of his career. The
long years of study in the fields of government, economics and in-
dustrial relations, and the concentrated specialization in administrative
and constitutional law, came to their natural fruition in his service
with the Company. His extraordinary legal and forensic ability,
coupled with his complete grasp of all phases of carrier regulation, made
him exceptionally fitted to deal with the many difficult cases and prob-
lems which arose during his terms of office.
Space precludes any detailed discussion of the litigation in which
Dickinson participated during this period, but some comment on the
more important cases which he handled is appropriate. Broadly speak-
ing, those cases fell into three fields: labor relations, corporate finance
and anti-trust law. In the first category were such cases as the Red Cap
Case,2" involving the legality under the Federal Fair Labor Standards
Act of the railroads' right to apply the tips of porters against the wages
due from the railroads to such employes; the Washington Terminal
Case,2" involving the right of a railroad employer to challenge in
court by declaratory judgment proceedings the legality of an award of
the Railway Adjustment Board; and the Full Crew Case,26 involving
the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania "Full Crew" law. Of all
these, the case which Dickinson later described as the most difficult
and important of his career was the Full Crew Case. In 1937, the
Pennsylvania legislature had passed a so-called "Full Crew Bill," which
required the presence of unnecessary employes on freight and passenger
trains and on switching crews throughout the state. Compliance
with this Act would have increased the costs of the Pennsylvania Rail-
road in Pennsylvania by about four million dollars annually. The
initial difficulty with which he was confronted was that the constitu-
tionality of other Full Crew laws had been sustained not only by the
United States Supreme Court, but also by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in a case arising under the State Constitution which had
been argued and lost by John G. Johnson himself in 1913.27 How-
ever, all the opinions which sustained Full Crew laws did so on the
ground that they were reasonably designed to promote safety. Dickin-
son therefore believed that if it could be shown by clear and convincing
evidence that the Pennsylvania Act of 1937 had no reasonable ten-
24. Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 35 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla. 1940),
118 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1941), 315 U.S. 386, (1942).
25. Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1941), 319
U.S. 732 (1943).
26. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Driscoll, 330 Pa. 97, 198 Ati. 130 (1938), 336 Pa. 310,
9 A.2d 621 (1939).
27. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Ewing, 241 Pa. 581, 88 Atl. 775 (1913).
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dency to promote safety, and in fact actually added to the hazards of
the crews, the adverse effect of the prior decisions would be avoided
and the unconstitutional character of the legislation would be demon-
strated. This Dickinson was able to do, before both the Dauphin
County Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, after a long and
bitterly contested 'suit in which he prepared all the pleadings and mo-
tions personally, examined and cross-examined all the witnesses, made
all the oral arguments for the plaintiff, and wrote practically all the
plaintiff's briefs. What chiefly characterized his work in this case,
as indeed in all other cases which he handled, was his immediate grasp
of essentials, the thoroughness of his preparation, which included
familiarizing himself completely with the history of the legislation and
of the cases involved, and his extraordinary capacity for absorbing ex-
ceptionally complex facts and details which he was able to keep con-
stantly at his fingertips. The case was prepared imaginatively, and it
was argued forcefully and convincingly against a broad background of
the purposes which the law sought to achieve. Even at the injunction
stage, he brought out his entire artillery without the preliminary jockey-
ing for position which so frequently accompanies the initial stages in
the trial of a case, and this bold move met with complete success. The
winning of the Full Crew Case brought his name to the fore as a rail-
road lawyer and gave him immediate stature as a leader in the in-
dustry.
In 1941 the cases which Dickinson handled shifted from those in-
volving labor to a series of cases turning, first, on issues of corporate
finance, and later of the anti-trust laws. Thus, he prepared much of
the economic material for and helped to argue the general rate increase
case known as Ex Parte 148 2 before the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. He also made the principal argument in the Competitive
Bidding Case,2 9 took a leading part in the anti-trust litigation which
ultimately resulted in railroad acquisition of the sleeping car business
from the Pullman Company,3" and participated in the preparation and
trial of the Pennroad Case.3 His oral argument in the latter case is
still referred to as a masterpiece of forensic presentation, characterized
by his remarkable ability to reduce extremely complex issues to simple
and readily comprehensible terms. The case, however, in which this
28. 259 I.C.C. 159 (1944).
29. 257 I.C.C. 129 (1944).
30. Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944); 61
F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1945); 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946); United States v.
Pullman Co., 64 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
31. Overfield and Weigle v. Pennroad Corp., 42 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1941),
48 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
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latter characteristic was not only most markedly evinced but most
signally successful was the famous Georgia Case, 2 in which the State
of Georgia, with the aid of the Department of Jusfice, attempted in an
anti-trust suit to prove a concerted plan on the part of the Pennsyl-
vania Railroad and other defendants to discriminate in rates against
that state and the south generally. In a three-day opening presenta-
tion before Special Master Lloyd K. Garrison, Dickinson reviewed the
entire technical and complex development of the rate structure in the
south and the east, and so effectively was he able to demonstrate the
absence of any coercion or other illegal practices in the establishment
of freight rates between the north and the south that the case was dis-
missed. One of the significant contributions of Dickinson in this case
was the completeness of his vindication of business practices in the
railroad industry, more particularly of rate conferences, which had
grown up over a period of years as an essential method of handling
rate matters.33
Important as these cases were to his clients, Dickinson's most en-
during contribution to the Railroad was in an area which lay beyond
the scope of his work in the preparation and trial of cases. To the
Pennsylvania, and to the industry generally, he became a legal states-
man whose wisdom and vision far transcended the day to day problems
of litigation. The brilliance of his mind, the shrewdness of his per-
ception, the practical and constructive approach to every problem, made
him particularly suited for the r6le of counselor, not only to the Penn-
sylvania but to the railroad industry as a whole. To attain such a
position is unusual, not to say difficult, for one coming to the Railroad
in middle life and as an outsider, but his profound knowledge of
economics and the principles of government, his thorough grasp of
practical business problems, and above all his tireless energy, were
among the Railroad's most valuable assets. Of his many contribu-
tions, one of the most important was his far-sighted recognition of the
r6le which the railroads must play in the national transportation sys-
tem and his understanding of the threat to the continuance of that
r6le which was presented not only by the direct competition from
motor carriers, water carriers and airways, but, more importantly, by
32. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). Upon motion of defend-
ants to dismiss and joinder therein by the complainant, amended bill of complaint dis-
missed, 340 U.S. 889 (1950).
33. At the time of his death, Dickinson was actively engaged in the defense of
another anti-trust case which, like the Georgia Case, presents issues as to the
scope of jurisdiction of the courts and an administrative body in the application of
the anti-trust laws. This was the suit brought by Seatrain Lines, Inc., against
the Pennsylvania Railroad and others in the District Court of New Jersey. Cf.
the complaint filed in I.C.C. Docket 31014 by a number of the defendants and other
railroads.
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the discriminatory and short-sighted transportation policies of the gov-
ernment. His broad view of this vital problem, which extended far
beyond the short-range standpoint of immediate interest, had a value
which cannot be measured even in the near future, for in his thinking
and planning he worked far ahead of the present. He envisaged the
broad outlines of a general picture of what the railroads should be
striving for, a broad arrangement of objectives according to a con-
sidered scale of values, and yet he had an acute awareness of the
extent to which action in one direction might foreclose it in another.
Thinking of this sort played a significant part in the cases which he
prepared himself and also in the litigation handled by members of
his Legal Department staff, who to a considerable extent absorbed
his point of view and carried it with them in their cases before the
Commission and the courts. Dickinson was also a leader in much of
the consultative and advisory work for the Association of American
Railroads, and he played a major part in the thinking which went into
the railroads' presentation of their position before the Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 1950, pursuant to Sen-
ate Resolution 50 relating to problems affecting domestic land and
water transportation.
The hard work and heavy responsibilities which Dickinson's serv-
ice with the Railroad entailed did not diminish the steady flow of
scholarly writing which came from his pen, and he continued to pro-
duce a series of important articles dealing with the various phases of
constitutional and administrative law with which he was immediately
concerned. During the period when his main interest was in cases
which involved the labor relations of the railroads, he compiled the
material for a book of several hundred pages on the history of labor
relations in the industry which was published by the so-called Bureau
of Information of the Eastern Railways.84 At about the same time he
also prepared an article dealing with new conceptions of contract in
labor relations, which was published in the Columbia Law Review.35
In the 'forties, when the relation between rate-making and the anti-
trust laws had become a very live issue because of the Georgia Case,
he wrote an important article on rate conferences at the invitation of
Duke University Law School. 6 He also found time in this period
to write a number of more general papers dealing with problems in
34. WAGES AND LABOR RELATIONS IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 1900-1941 (1942).
35. New Conceptions of Contract in Labor Relations, 43 COL. L. REv. 688
(1943).
36. Rate Conferences in the Railroad Industry Under the Sherman Act and the
Act to Regulate Commerce, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 470 (1947). Cf. Railroad
Rates and the Anti-Trust Laws, 12 I.C.C. PPAc. J. 936 (1945).
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legal philosophy, 7 international law 11 and with the scope and limits
of the functions of government . 9  At the time of his death a book on
the history of political institutions was in progress, and one on juris-
prudence was planned. A gigantic collection of offprints, notes and
clippings, relating to current history, government policy and economics,
to which he was continually adding, suggests that he may also have
contemplated preparing an elaborate economic history of our own times.
It will have become apparent that much of Dickinson's writing
grew out of or was closely connected with his legal practice. This was
true not only of the period when he served with the Railroad but of
earlier periods as well. For example, his article criticizing the inef-
fectiveness of the anti-trust laws grew out of his work on the Sugar
Institute Case,4" and his article on neutrality from his work in the
Department of Commerce.41 Much of what he wrote dealt accord-
ingly with matters of current interest and importance, but he always
saw specific problems against the broad perspective of his whole think-
ing about law, economics and government. This projection of the
specific onto the level of generality gave his writing an importance
which it might otherwise have lacked, and at the same time made more
understandable the complex issues and problems with which he dealt.
His remarkable capacity for presentation, combined with an unusual
felicity of expression, made a real contribution to the thinking of the
legal profession as a whole. The constructiveness with which he ap-
proached problems which he had analyzed and explained added further
to his effectiveness. The benefit of his practical experience as well as
his thinking were thus constantly being made available to the Bar, not
only through his writing but through his participation in conference
work with other lawyers in Bar Association meetings. Nowhere, per-
haps, was Dickinson's influence on the Bar more apparent than in the
field of administrative law and procedure. Not only were his views
as to the proper scope of review of administrative determinations con-
stantly being pressed before state bar associations 42 and in law review
37. My Philosophy of Law, in My PH LOSOPHY or LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN
AmRCAN ScHoLARs (1941).
38. Enemy-Owned Property: Restitution or Confiscation?, 22 FomGN AFFAnls
126 (1943); Peace, Realism and the Balance of Power, 50 MD. STATE B.A.J. 75
(1945).
39. Planned Society, 37 BULL. COLL. WILLIAM AND MARY 1 (1943); Legal
Change and the Rule of Law, 44 DIcK. L. REv. 149 (1940). See also articles cited
in notes 22 and 23 supra.
40. See note 13 supra.
41. See note 21 supra.
42. Administrative Law Under the Constitution, 7 Mo. B.J. 107, 116 (1936)
Report of the Committee on Administrative Law, 3 FED. BJ. 58 (1937). It should
be noted that, as Chairman of the Section on Administrative Law of the Penn-
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articles,' but, as a member of the Federal Bar Association's Commit-
tee on Administrative Law, he was instrumental in having the Ad-
ministrative Law Committee of the American Bar Association re-
consider the support it had given to the original bill of Senator Logan
for an Administrative Court-which would have been vested with a
heterogeneous classification of disputes bearing little relation to the
ability and knowledge of the judges serving thereon-and adopt the ap-
proach which ultimately eventuated in the Administrative Procedure
Act in 1946. It is interesting to note that a critique of the judicial
review provisions of that Act, delivered in 1947," foreshadowed, if
it did not predict, the Supreme Court's position in the Universal
Camera Case4 5 He had also been quick to note the crystalization
among some government officials of a view that administrative action
in the field of private conduct should be for the purpose of superim-
posing governmental management over, and in substitution for, pri-
vate management, and to warn of the consequences of widespread ac-
ceptance of that view. 6  Thus, his influence on the American Bar
lay not only in the development of rules of law which he was able
to persuade the courts to adopt but in the development of informed
opinion among lawyers generally through his active participation in
Bar activities and through those of his writings which were addressed
primarily to practicing lawyers.
If much of Dickinson's writing grew out of problems with which
he was confronted in his practice and in government service, a sub-
stantial amount was the product of his life-long interests in political
science, jurisprudence and history. Undoubtedly one of the most im-
portant of his writings is his Administrative fustice, whose brilliance
time has in no way tarnished and which is still regarded as the basic
and authoritative treatment of the subject.4' It is not, of course,
sylvania Bar Association, Dickinson helped to prepare bills introducing proposed
amendments to the Administrative Agency Law. See 55 REP. PA. BAR Ass'x 192
(1949).
43. E.g., Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations: A Summary and
Evaluation, 25 MINN. L. REv. 588 (1941); Administrative Management, Administra-
tive Regulation and the Judicial Process, 89 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 1052 (1941); The
Acheson Report: A Novel Approach to Administrative Law, 90 U. OF PA. L. Rxv.
757 (1942); Judicial Characteristics of Administrative Regulation, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q.
239 (1948).
44. Judicial Review Provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, in
THE FEDERAL ADmINISTRATIVE PRocEDuR. Acr 546 (Warren ed. 1947).
45. Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
46. Judicial Review of Administrative Determinatiots: A Sumnuiry and Evalua-
tion, 25 MINN. L. REv. 588, 609-610 (1941).
47. A rare dissent from this position may be found in a recent textbook which
states that the law has long been at variance with the doctrine of the "supremacy
of law" and that the only significant recognition of the doctrine by the Supreme
Court is in a concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the St. Joseph Stock
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possible to distinguish sharply between those writings which might be
characterized as chiefly academic and those which relate to more prac-
tical matters, for his treatment of any specific problem, whether in law
or in economics, or in government, was deeply colored by his knowl-
edge of the experience of the past and by his essentially philosophic
point of view towards all questions. Nevertheless, he wrote a con-
siderable number of articles which did not grow out of any practical
problem but which deal on a more abstract level with the relation be-
tween law and society. To many he is best known and will be chiefly
remembered, both in this country and abroad, for his contributions
to thought on this general problem." Here his writing was at its
best-the smooth, direct, effortless prose which eschewed the affected,
and was characterized by skillful use of the pungent phrase, the apt
illustration, and above all by the clear presentation of abstract proposi-
tions in terms of basic and readily understood concrete principles.
Reference has already been made to the notable series of articles
on political science and jurisprudence which began to appear in the
'twenties and which continued even during the period when he was so
occupied with the legal and executive work of the Railroad. It re-
mains to refer to a projected history of political thought and institutions
upon which he was at work when he died and which in the long run
would very probably have proved to be the crowning intellectual
achievement of his career. In this work it was his purpose to trace
the growth of western political thought, from Hellenic times to the
present, against a detailed background of the development of law and
the institutions of government; in it he intended to emphasize the
effect of geographic, ethnic and economic conditions, as well as the
pressures of organized political groups and their spokesmen. To this
task he brought not only his own profound thinking about the nature
Yards Case, 298 U.S. 38 (1936). DAvis, ADmINISTRATivE LAW 33-34 (1951). The
author there criticizes (at n. 103) a passage in Dickinson, to the effect that the
law ought to be applied by an agency whose main business is to know the law
rather than to enforce some part of it, which is characterized as "unsound, even
absurd." Davis attempts to demonstrate the absurdity by the following example:
"Who can best determine what the law should be as to the maximum amount of
poison spray on fruit-a judge . . . or the appropriate expert of the Department
of Agriculture?" Ibid. Dickinson would of course have been the first to agree that
the expert should make the determination, subject, however, to review by a court
as to the reasonableness of the determination. In his reference to the Stock Yards
Case, Davis seems to have overlooked the fact that Dickinson argued the case as
Assistant Attorney General.
48. See especially, Social Order and Political Authority, 23 AM. PoL. Sca. REV.
293, 593 (1929) ; A Working Theory of Sovereignty, 42 PoL. ScI. Q. 524 (1927),
43 id. 32 (1928); The Law Behind Law, 29 Cor. L. REv. 113, 285 (1929); La
Coutfime, La Reconciliation Volontaire des Interts, et le Droit, 2 ANNUAIME DE
L'INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE PHLosop] m Du DROIT ET DE SOCIOLOGIE JURIDIQUE
(1935-36).
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of law and government but his historical training and his knowledge
of Greek and Latin. Over two thousand pages were written, but the
manuscript breaks off in the period of Augustus. What has been done
is nevertheless sufficiently complete to stand by itself, and revision for
publication is now in progress.49 The work is as learned in its detail
as it is scholarly in its presentation, based as it is upon original sources
and reflecting a thorough familiarity with the secondary literature
in French, German and Italian, as well as in English. What makes
it so important a contribution is the fresh approach to old problems
by a trained economist and historian who had given so much thought
to the basic problems and principles of government.
This great project undoubtedly grew out of Dickinson's general
thinking about law and society, for he was impressed by how little the
history of human government has to record of free government or
popular government in any sense. Although the Greeks knew de-
mocracy for a short span of years, the only example of stable popular
government until modern times is that of Rome, and he believed that
a detailed study of Roman institutions would afford instructive lessons
with respect to the principles upon which democracy rests. Our present-
day problems, he thought, cannot be investigated to any considerable
extent by statistical techniques, but call for historical analysis with wise
and understanding social observation." It was his view that there
was a significant connection between the fact that Roman law and
English common law are the only two mature bodies of jurisprudence
in the world and that only Rome and England have been able to attain
relative permanence for free government. Thus he wrote:
"The point is that at Rome not merely was there no attempt
to improve the condition of the common man through the estab-
lishment of social democracy, but the relations of all men alike
with other men were in the main determined by a body of law
which did not emanate from the political decisions of the govern-
ment. From time to time the legislature might alter this law in
some particular detail, or might declare it by statute, but until the
period of the Empire it was not in the main what we understand
by legislative law. It was lawyer's law, built up by slow accre-
tions to meet particular situations as they arose and developed by
the application ofJogic to accepted fundamental principles. It
was a law of reason shaped and enlarged by the reasoning of pro-
fessionally trained lawyers and not dictated as a consequence of
political pressures. Thus it grew very slowly, it was at any given
49. As a last request, the manuscript was turned over to Professor G. L. Haskins
for such disposition as he saw fit.
50. The Old Political Philosophy and the New, 87 Am. PHILos. Soc'" PRoc.
246, 262 (1943).
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time relatively stable and certain, and its growth was along con-
sistent and uniform lines." "'
It was inevitable that academic honors should come to one of John
Dickinson's extraordinary intellectual gifts-prizes and fellowships as
a student, honorary degrees as a man.5" He was a Fellow of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a member of the American
Philosophical Society, the American Law Institute, and was one of the
few Americans ever to be elected to the Institut International de Phil-
osophie du Droit et de Sociologie Juridique. All these honors he bore
modestly and unassumingly. His membership in learned societies, such
as the Mediaeval Academy, the American Historical Association and
the American Academy of Political Science, reflected the diversity and
the breadth of his scholarly interests. Other honors would have been
his for the taking. He was offered the deanship of at least one law
school, and, it is reported, the presidency of three universities, but he
was impatient of administrative work and could not bring himself to
quit either his writing or his practice. It is also reported that President
Conant offered him one of the much-coveted University Professorships
at Harvard. Although Dickinson declined these important offers, he
never ceased to be interested in education at all levels. For many years
he served on the Board of Visitors and Governors of Washington Col-
lege and devoted considerable time to the affairs of that institution.
He followed closely the writings and careers of his academic friends and
acquaintances in the disparate fields of their specialties, and read avidly
the book reviews in learned journals and the new listings in foreign
catalogs. When occasion permitted, he would talk for hours about
some obscure problem in canon law, or the contributions of a little-
known judge, or a novel interpretation of history. Shortly before
his death, he told the writer that he wanted to sit down with him at
an early date and work out the details of the development of taxation
in mediaeval England.
Neither the distractions of government service nor absorption with
active practice and writing dulled Dickinson's pleasure in teaching.
During the period when he was in Washington as Assistant Secretary
of Commerce and as Assistant Attorney General, he commuted two days
a week to Philadelphia to give his courses at !he Law School. Later,
when he joined the staff of the Railroad, he kept regularly to a schedule
which permitted him to give at least one course each year. He even
51. The Common Man and the Common Law, Annual Address before the Vir-
ginia State Bar Ass'n 21 (1943).
52. LL. D., Tusculum (1929), Dickinson (1934), Johns Hopkins (1948).
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worked up a set of materials for a new course in legal theory which
he gave in 1940 and called "Methods of Legal Thinking and Analysis."
The course was an outgrowth of ideas developed in a paper already
referred to" and subsequently published in a volume prepared in
honor of the great French jurist, Frangois G6ny. 4 The outbreak
of war and the necessity for concentrating on the bare essentials of
the legal curriculum prevented his giving it more than once. Despite
his appointment as General Counsel of the Railroad in 1941, which
added administrative duties to his already heavy load, he continued to
teach the course in Constitutional Law. In the dark days of the war,
when there was real likelihood that the Law School might have to
close its doors for lack of students and tuition fees, Dickinson served
entirely without compensation. In 1948, exhaustion from overwork,
which came about after the conclusion of his almost superhuman
efforts in connection with the Georgia Case, brought him sharply to a
realization that the burden of teaching was one which he could not
continue without serious impairment of his health. On February 11,
1948, he wrote regretfully to Dean Harrison to say that the time had
arrived to sever his connection.with the Law School. It was char-
acteristic of his dislike of publicity to request that no announcement of
his resignation be made until the end of the academic year along with
the routine announcements of appointments and resignations. Other
factors had caused him to give considerable thought to resignation,
and these undoubtedly played some part in his decision. In response
to a letter from President McClelland, which expressed the latter's
appreciation for his teaching and his loyalty to the University, Dickin-
son wrote:
"Academic work under the conditions of modem life seems
to me to be at best difficult. On the one hand, the academic
man who has no real job in the practical work of our time feels
isolated and unfamiliar with many of the things which he has to
deal with in his teaching. On the other hand, if he does become
involved in practical work, the pressure to which he is subjected
inevitably makes him feel that he is not performing the full meas-
ure of his academic obligations."
His dilemma was a real one, but the break with teaching, which he
described as his "first love," must indeed have been hard. The extent
to which he felt a void in his life is perhaps shown by the intensifica-
tion of his work on the Roman portion of his history of political institu-
tions, to which he devoted himself with new energy at the end of each
53. See note 11 supra.
54. RECUmL T'Avmns SUR LES SoURcEs Du DRorr E x'HoNNEUR DE FRAxgOIS
GANY (1935).
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long day at the Railroad. He worked incessantly, night after night,
until the early hours of the morning, at his books and on the manu-
script, with a determination which almost suggested that he was writing
against time. If there was a tragedy in the life of John Dickinson,
it was that compared with what he knew, and had acquired so labor-
iously, so little remains.
His death in Baltimore was both sudden and unexpected. He died
of embolism on the evening of the fifth day following an operation
from which he was recovering successfully, and he was buried on his
native Eastern Shore only a few miles from his home at Crosiadore,
where his ancestors had settled nearly three centuries before.
So great were the capacities of John Dickinson, and so extensive
the range of his achievements, that they had an inevitable tendency to
set him apart from others and to create in those who did not know him
an impression of reserve if not of aloofness. His manner, which was
deliberate and decisive, tended to discourage intimacy even among
his associates, and the fact that in latter years he was so busy with
the important and serious problems of the Railroad created about
him an air of intense preoccupation. Although he never preached or
paraded his learning, his manner struck some as pontifical when he
expressed a conclusion which he had come to regard as a certainty.
Those who worked closely with him, and those who knew him well,
knew that such impressions were misleading. He had pondered
so deeply many of the problems which perplexed lesser minds that
he gave an impression of impatience with what seemed to him trivial
or banal, and in truth he was not one to suffer fools gladly. He es-
pecially admired and appreciated in others the excellence of the qualities
he possessed himself, and to such he gave of himself freely, in time
and patience and understanding. Generous of heart and mind, he was
always sensitive and sympathetic to the problems and difficulties of
others. His friends, therefore, were many, and in every walk of life,
both the great and the small; but his circle of intimates was not large,
and his relations with them were characterized by the affection and
generosity that comes from the warmth of understanding. These knew
his kindliness and courtesy, his laughter and merriment. He loved
their companionship, and he has left vivid memories of long evenings
at Crosiadore, where good talk and the attentiveness of his gracious
wife made memorable the hospitality of his house. The brilliance of his
conversation, and the range of subjects upon which he delighted to dis-
course, was almost overwhelming, and yet he was always alert to
know the views of his colloquitors and never resented a position con-
trary to his own.
JOHN DICKINSON, 1894-1952
Dickinson's interests were legion. He read as many as five news-
papers daily, and kept a fascinated eye on politics, both local and na-
tional. A devout member of the Episcopal church, he served as vestry-
man in his parish. He was a successful farmer and was a member of
the Maryland Agricultural Society for the Eastern Shore. He was an
accomplished student of English literature and an indefatigable reader of
memoirs, letters and biography, which provided him with a fund of
anecdotes as entertaining as they were instructive. His detailed
knowledge of family history and genealogy, both in England and
America, and his capacity for understanding the characters and motiva-
tions of men of the past, were without parallel, and enabled him to create
in the minds of his listeners pictures of the societies of other days
which were so vivid that it seemed almost as if he had lived in them.
His prejudices were few, but they were deep-seated, for they arose
from carefully considered convictions based on his understanding of
history and his own observation of people about him. He detested
Emerson, whom he reviled as "that Socinian Divine," and the whole
tribe of "children of light" who had become the apostles of the new
gospel of the common man, and his invective against them was as ex-
pressive as the scorn which he felt. His great heroes were John Mar-
shall and Daniel Webster, and in talking of them one felt that he had
known them personally, as he referred familiarly to this or that opinion
or attitude. It has been said that he would have been distinctly at
home among the great men of our Revolutionary period-Franklin,
Madison, Hamilton and Gouverneur Morris-and, indeed, the range of
his interests and general philosophical approach to all questions be-
longed more to the eighteenth century than to the twentieth. He
sometimes lamented the absence of great men of vision in our time,
but it would never have occurred to him that he was himself of the
same stamp as the great of our country's past. It would not have
occurred to him that the generation of those who come after him
could truthfully say with the moralist that we are scarce the shadows
that our fathers cast at noon.
To characterize briefly the great qualities of John Dickinson is as
impossible as it is to epitomize his achievements. It might nevertheless
not have displeased him to have it written of him by way of epitaph,
as Tacitus did of a great Roman:
quidquid . . amavimus, quidquid mirati sumus, manet
mansurumque est in animis hominum, in aeternitate temporum,
in fama rerum; nam multos veterum velut inglorios et ignobilis
oblivio obruit; . . . posteritati narratus et traditus superstes
erit.55
55. TAcITUs, AGRICOLA, c. 46.
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